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CRIMINAL PROCEDURE-HABITUAL OFFENDERS-COLLATERAL
ATTACK ON PRIOR FOREIGN COVICTIONS IN A
RECIDIVIST PROCEEDING*

Under New Mexico's habitual offender laws, a defendant's prior
felony covictions may be used to increase his sentence upon conviction of a subsequent felony.' Similar recidivist statutes are in gen2
eral use throughout the United States.
The Supreme Court of the United States has said, regarding recidivist statutes, "that the constitutionality of inflicting severer
criminal penalties upon habitual offenders is no longer open to
serious challenge. '" This is primarily because a determination that a
person is an habitual criminal or multiple offender is not a conviction
for a substantive crime.' As stated by the Supreme Court,
The sentence as . . . [an] habitual criminal is not to be viewed as

either a new jeopardy or additional penalty for the earlier crimes. It
is a stiffened penalty for the latest crime, which is considered to be
an aggravated offense because a repetitive one.5
In the United States, the most common method of recidivist ad* State v. Dalrymple, 407 P.2d 356 (N.M. 1965).
1. N.M. Stat. Ann. §§ 40A-29-5 to 40A-29-8 (Repl. 1964). Section 40A-29-5 specifies
the punishment to be imposed on habitual offenders. Section 40A-29-6 delineates the
duty of district attorneys regarding charging persons as habitual offenders. Section
40A-29-7 concerns the proceedings for prosecution of habitual offenders. This section
requires that a defendant be informed of the charge alleging his prior convictions,
and that he state whether he is the same person whose prior convictions are alleged in
the charge. The section continues,
If the defendant denies being the same person or refuses to answer, or remains
silent, his plea or the fact of his silence, shall be entered of record and a jury
shall be empaneled to inquire if the offender is the same person mentioned in
the several records as set forth in the information. If the jury finds that the
defendant is the same person and that he has in fact been convicted of such
previous crimes as charged . . . then the court shall sentence him to the
punishment prescribed in section 29-5 [§ 40A-29-5] governing habitual offenders. ...

2. See, e.g., N.Y. Pen. Law §§ 1941-1943; Okla. Stat. Ann. tit. 21, § 51 (1963)
Utah Code Ann. §§ 76-1-18, 76-1-19 (1953).
3. Oyler v. Boles, 368 U.S. 448, 451 (1962). See also Graham v. West Virginia, 224
U.S. 616 (1912), in which it was held that a recidivist statute did not violate the due
process, privileges and immunities, and equal protection clauses of the fourteenth
amendment. In McDonald v. Massachusetts, 180 U.S. 311 (1901), sentencing under a
recidivist statute was held not to inflict cruel and unusual punishment.
4. Gryger v. Burke, 334 U.S. 728 (1948).
5. Id. at 732. The New Mexico Supreme Court has adopted this reasoning in
support of New Mexico's habitual offender laws. See, e.g., French v. Cox, 74 N.M.
593, 396 P.2d 423 (1964).
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judication is the supplementary procedure, which requires that a
person charged as a multiple offender receive a hearing on the issue
subsequent to, and separate from, his trial for the present, substantive crime. 6 Although a charge of being a multiple offender or
habitual criminal is not a charge of a substantive crime, recent decisions require that a defendant in a recidivist proceeding be afforded
the same procedural rights and privileges available to an accused in
a prosecution for a substantive crime.7 The severity of the increased
punishment resulting from a determination that a defendant is a
multiple offender surely demands this protection.
Under New Mexico's habitual offender statutes,8 if a person has
been convicted of a felony within the state, and it appears that he
has previously been convicted of a felony in New Mexico or convicted of a crime in another jurisdiction which would be a felony if
committed in New Mexico, it is the prosecuting district attorney's
duty to file an information charging the person as an habitual off ender.' The defendant is informed of the allegations in the information
and of his right to a trial on the charge. 10 He is then required to
state whether or not he is the same person charged in the information. 1 The procedure thereafter depends on the defendant's answer
to the charge. For example, in New Mexico,
If the defendant denies being the same person, or refuses to answer,

or remains silent, his plea or the fact of his silence shall be entered of
record and a jury empaneled to inquire if the defendant is the same

person mentioned in the several records as set forth in the information. If the jury finds that the defendant is the same person and that
he has in fact been convicted of such previous crimes as charged . . .

then the court shall sentence him to the punishment prescribed in

section 29-5 [§ 40A-29-5] governing habitual offenders ....

12

Until quite recently, if a defendant remained silent or denied
6. Dubroff, Recidivist Procedures, 40 N.Y.U.L. Rev. 332 (1965).

7. See, e.g., Oyler v. Boles, 368 U.S. 448 (1962)

(requirement of reasonable notice

of the charge); Chewning v. Cunningham, 368 U.S. 443 (1962) (right to counsel).
Neither Chewning nor Chandler v. Fretag, 348 U.S. 3 (1954), answers the question of
whether a state must provide counsel in recidivist proceedings. But in view of Gideon
v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963), and Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353 (1963),
it is most probable that a state would be constitutionally required to furnish counsel
for an indigent defendant in a recidivist proceeding.
8. N.M. Stat. Ann. §§ 40A-29-5 to 40A-29-8 (Repl. 1964).
9. N.M. Stat. Ann. § 40A-29-6 (Repl. 1964).
10. N.M. Stat. Ann. § 40A-29-7 (Repl. 1964).
11. Ibid.
12. N.M. Stat. Ann. § 40A-29-7 (Repl. 1964). (Emphasis added.)
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the charge, the only issue to be resolved at trial was whether the accused was the same person convicted in the prior convictions. 13 In
State v. Dalrymple,'4 however, the New Mexico Supreme Court
held that evidence amounting to a collateral attack on prior out-ofstate convictions is admissible in such a trial. Although the supreme
court had previously hinted that prior New Mexico convictions
might be inquired into in a recidivist proceeding,' 5 Dalrymple presented for the first time the question of whether the statute would
permit a direct attack. Although the court, in deciding Dalrymple,
did not consider prior New Mexico convictions, the decision was undoubtedly meant to affect them as well. In view of the fact that prior
New Mexico convictions may have already been susceptible to attack
by habeas corpus, 6 Dalrymple appears to have created a remedy for
the alleged multiple offender whose prior convictions were in another
state. The purpose of this Comment is to examine the probable prospective effect of the Dalrymple decision in view of the change it
makes in New Mexico law.
In Dalrymple, the defendant had pleaded guilty to one count of
armed robbery. On the same day, he was charged with being an
habitual offender on the ground that he had previously been convicted in Texas of three crimes which would have been felonies if
committed in New Mexico. The defendant pleaded not guilty to the
habitual offender charge, and pursuant to section 40A-29-7 of the
New Mexico statutes he was tried on the issue of his prior convictions. At trial, the defendant offered evidence that he had received
only pro forma representation by counsel in each of the three Texas
proceedings that resulted in the convictions upon which the New
Mexico habitual offender charge was based. The district attorney
moved to strike this evidence on the ground that it amounted to a
collateral attack on the Texas judgements, and that such a collateral
attack could not be made on proceedings which appeared regular on
their face. The trial court granted the motion, and the jury subsequently found that the defendant was the same person convicted in
each of the Texas cases. In accordance with the statute, he was
7
then sentenced to life imprisonment.
13. See, e.g., Lott v. Cox, 401 P.2d 93 (N.M. 1965) ; State v. McCraw, 59 N.M. 348,
284 P.2d 670 (1955).
14. 407 P.2d 356 (N.M. 1965).
15. Cf. State v. Powers, 401 P.2d 775 (N.M. 1965).
16. Cf. French v. Cox, 74 N.M. 593, 396 P.2d 423 (1964) ; Sneed v. Cox, 74 N.M.
659, 397 P.2d 308 (1964) ; Jordan v. Swope, 36 N.M. 84, 8 P.2d 788 (1932).
17. N.M. Stat. Ann. § 40A-29-5 (Repl. 1964).
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On appeal, the New Mexico Supreme Court, held, Reversed,
with instructions to grant the defendant a new trial. 8 The defendant contended that the trial court's refusal to admit the evidence
challenging the regularity of the Texas convictions as a defense to
the habitual criminal charge was a denial of due process. The
supreme court said that there was nothing in the statute to prevent
the trial court from hearing evidence directed to the validity of the
prior convictions; that the statute must have "contemplated that
the convictions were valid and not void because of some constitutional defect." 19
In Dalrymple, the court recognized that constitutionally void convictions cannot be used to support increased penalties under a
recidivist statute, since a void conviction is a nullity.2 ° The precise
question facing the court, however, was whether section 40A-29-7
of the New Mexico statutes precludes a defendant from contesting
the validity of a foreign conviction in the recidivist proceeding. 2'
Although the court in Dalrymple decided only that the statute permits such collateral attacks, it appears the decision was primarily
motivated by a notion that due process requires this result. Although
a normal reading of the language in the statute indicates the only
issue to be resolved at trial is one of identity, 22 the statute must be
so interpreted if New Mexico's procedure regarding multiple offenders is to have constitutional validity. The court, as previously
mentioned, did not decide the case on constitutional grounds, and
refused to comment on whether prior foreign convictions could be
successfully attacked in a petition for habeas corpus. In determining
only that the statute permits an attack, it would appear that the
court precluded a retroactive application of the decision.
Although the New Mexico Supreme Court avoided the constitu18. 407 P.2d at 361.
19. Ibid.
20. The court adopted the view of the West Virginia Supreme Court, as stated in
State ex rel. Carver v. Boles, 142 S.E.2d 731 (W. Va. 1965) :
It is now well established that the denial of the fundamental right of the
defendant to the assistance of counsel in a criminal proceeding applies to and
invalidates any prior conviction of an offense within the meaning of a recidivist statute, and that such conviction . . . being null and void because of
such denial, can not justify or support the imposition of any additional punishment under such statute.
142 S.E.2d at 733.
21. Compare State v. Powers, 401 P.2d 775 (N.M. 1965).
22. State v. Dalrymple, 407 P.2d 356 (N.M. 1965): "It would appear from the
language [in the statute] . . . that the only issue to be determined is whether the
defendant is the same person who was previously convicted of other crimes as
charged." Id. at 358.
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tional issue of whether a state must provide a forum in which prior
foreign convictions used to support a multiple offender charge may
be attacked, the issue was faced directly by the New York courts.
Prior to 1964, the New York multiple offender laws were virtually
the same as those of New Mexico;2 the statutory language provided no method by which a person charged thereunder could contest the validity of prior convictions. Although a person sentenced
as a multiple offender could contest the validity of prior New York
convictions by a writ of error coram nobis, 24 a defendant sentenced
on the basis of prior foreign convictions was without a remedy. The
New York courts had repeatedly held that neither habeas corpus 25
nor coram nobis2" would lie to attack prior foreign convictions.
The rationale for precluding the use of habeas corpus was that
"that remedy comes into use only when the court entering the judgement attacked was without jurisdiction of the person or . . . the
crime, ' ' 27 unless a defendant could show there was no possibility of
seeking redress from the foreign court which rendered the judgement under attack.28 The New York courts seemed to ignore the
fact that, as a very practical matter, an imprisoned defendant is in no
position to proceed in the foreign jurisdiction which rendered the
judgement and thus could really do very little about a foreign conviction. The courts further stated that New York was under no duty to
provide a forum to contest the constitutional validity of prior
foreign convictions, and that the refusal of its courts to do so did
not violate a defendant's fundamental rights :21 If there was a constitutional defect in the New York procedure, it was cured by the
fact that a defendant could seek federal habeas corpus relief if
23. N.Y. Pen. Law §§ 1941-43.
24. People v. Wilson, 13 N.Y.2d 277, 196 N.E.2d 251, 246 N.Y.S.2d 608 (1963),
appeal dismissed, 377 U.S. 925 (1964) :
It is, of course, settled that a New York State court will entertain and act on a
coram nobis petition which prays for the setting aside of a prior conviction in
that same court and if the allegations of the petition are proven will direct
that the multiple offense conviction be corrected so as to eliminate therefrom
any additional punishment visited upon the petitioner because of the invalidated earlier criminal judgement.
Id. at 281, 196 N.E.2d at 253, 246 N.Y.S.2d at 611.
25. People v. McCullough, 300 N.Y. 107, 89 N.E.2d 335 (1949) ; People v. Wilson,
supra note 24.
26. See cases cited note 25 supra.
27. People v. Wilson, 13 N.Y.2d 277, 280, 196 N.E.2d 251, 252, 246 N.Y.S.2d 608,
610 (1963).
28. People v. McCullough, 300 N.Y. 107, 89 N.E.2d 335 (1949).
29. People v. Wilson, 13 N.Y.2d 277, 196 N.E.2d 251, 246 N.Y.S.2d 608 (1963),
appeal dismissed, 377 U.S. 925 (1964).
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there was no state remedy available."0 The reasoning supporting
this argument seemed to be that if a defendant's constitutional rights
were violated, they were violated by the court that rendered the
prior conviction, not by the New York courts in later using the
conviction at its face value.
The federal courts, in granting habeas corpus to New York multiple offenders, did not agree with the position taken by the New
York state courts. The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit concluded that the violation of due process was by the
state that used an invalid prior conviction to increase criminal
penalties. 3' This conclusion seriously jeopardized the constitutionality of New York's refusal to test prior foreign convictions:
To the extent that any State makes its penal sanctions depend in part
on the fact of prior convictions elsewhere, necessarily it must assume
the burden of meeting attacks on the constitutionality of such convictions. Constitutional guarantees should not be shorn of their vitality merely to facilitate the administration of a penal policy whereby
32
the sentence on one conviction depends in part on a prior conviction.
The New York courts realized, however, that the constitution-

ality of the state's multiple offender procedures was threatened.
Whether this realization resulted from the federal court's attack
on the New York procedure, or was prompted by the apparent unfairness of the New York procedure itself is not clear. Nevertheless,
the realization was present, as reflected in People v. Wilson :"3
Because a grave question is raised as to the lawfulness, under constitutional principles, of defendant's continued detention [under a
multiple offender sentence] . . . the issues raised should not be disposed of on a narrow procedural rule . . . without further exploration. Sensitivity to the constitutional rights of defendants without
niceties is of long standing in this
precious adherence to procedural
34
State . . . [citations omitted].
The New York courts refused, however, to change their position
30. Ibid.
31. United States ex rel. LaNear v. LaVallee, 306 F.2d 417 (2d Cir. 1962) ; United
States ex rel. Savini v. Jackson, 250 F.2d 349 (2d Cir. 1957).
32. United States ex rel. Savini v. Jackson, supra note 31, at 355. See also United
States ex rel. LaNear v. LaVallee, supra note 31.
33. 18 App. Div. 2d 424, 239 N.Y.S.2d 900, aff'd, 13 N.Y.2d 277, 196 N.E.2d 251,
246 N.Y.S.2d 608 (1963), appeal dismissed, 377 U.S. 925 (1964).
34. 239 N.Y.S.2d at 903.
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regarding collateral attacks on prior foreign convictions in New
York multiple offender proceedings; the courts felt that they were
bound by prior state decisions on the question. A person charged as
a multiple offender remained without a procedure to attack as constitutionally invalid a prior foreign conviction supporting the New
York multiple offender charge.
Realizing the doubtful constitutional status of New York's multiple offender law and the somewhat reluctant attitude of its courts
toward maintaining the then existing interpretation of it, the New
York legislature amended the statute in 1964.", The amendment
provides that upon arraignment of a defendant as a multiple offender, he may challenge the constitutionality of a prior foreign
or New York conviction supporting the charge.3 6 Thus, New York,
perhaps led by the United States Court of Appeals for the Second
Circuit, appears to have remedied any constitutional infirmity in the
statutory and procedural requirements for multiple offender proceedings.
Although the United States Supreme Court has never directly
answered the question whether a state using a recidivist statute must
allow a collateral attack on prior convictions, the Court's opinions
on related questions indicate that a state must do so. In Oyler v.
Boles, the precise question confronting the Court was whether a
defendant must receive notice of the multiple offender charge before his trial for the substantive crime. Although the narrow holding was that a defendant need have only reasonable notice and an
opportunity to be heard regarding the charge, the Court's reasoning in Oyler bears upon the present problem. The requirement of
notice is in part to enable a defendant to prepare his case; and, as
stated by the Court, "Indeed, we may assume that any infirmities
in the prior convictions open to collateral attack could have been
reached in the recidivist proceedings, either because the state law
so permits or due process so requires.""8 Similarly, the Supreme
Court has held that due process requires that a defendant be afforded the right to counsel in recidivist proceedings on the ground,
35. N.Y. Laws 1964, ch. 446.
36. N.Y. Pen. Law §§ 1941-43.
37. 368 U.S. 448 (1962).
38. Id. at 454. The Court also commented on the precise question facing the New
Mexico court in Dalrymple: "The fact that the statute expressly provides for a jury
trial on the issue of identity and is silent as to how other issues are to be determined
does not foreclose the raising of issues other than identity." Id. at 454 n,9.
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inter alia, that counsel might find some defect in a prior conviction
that would preclude its use in a multiple offender proceeding.8 9
Thus, it appears that the Supreme Court would require not only
that a state provide a method by which to attack prior convictions,
but also that
the method provided be a part of the recidivist pro40
ceedings.
The New Mexico Supreme Court's decision in Dalrymple appears
to represent the development of recidivist law in this area as embodied in United States Supreme Court decisions, decisions by the
United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, and the
evolution of New York's present law. Dalrymple may accurately
reflect a constitutional mandate requiring any state seeking to increase criminal penalties on the basis of prior felony convictions to
permit the defendant to challenge the validity of the prior convictions.
Although the Dalrymple decision now permits a defendant in a
New Mexico multiple offender proceeding to attack the validity of
prior foreign convictions, the New Mexico Supreme Court did not
reveal the procedure by which this should be done. It is therefore
recommended that the New Mexico legislature amend section 40A29-7 of the New Mexico statutes to provide: (1) a method by
which a defendant charged as a multiple offender may contest the
constitutional validity of the prior convictions upon which the multiple offender charge is based, and (2) a procedure by which the
validity of the challenged prior convictions is determined solely by
the court on the basis of the previous records and the facts asserted
and supported by corroborative affidavits.
To accomplish these proposals, it is further recommended that
the New Mexico legislature adopt the related language of section
1943 of the New York Penal Law, as follows:
[N]o previous conviction in this or any other state shall be utilized
for multiple offender treatment pursuant to this . . . [section] if
39. Reynolds v. Cochran, 365 U.S. 525 (1961) ; cf. Chewning v. Cunningham, 368
U.S. 443 (1962).
40. In Oyler v. Boles, 368 U.S. 448 (1962), Mr. Justice Douglas, dissenting, stated
that
unless any infirmities in the prior convictions that can be reached on collateral
attack can be reached in [the recidivist] . . . proceedings, the wrong done is
seriously compounded.
Id. at 461-62. The reasoning in Justice Douglas' dissenting statement did not affect the
narrow procedural ground on which the case was decided.

324
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such conviction was obtained in violation of the rights of the person
accused under the applicable provisions of the constitution of the
United States.
An objection that the previous conviction was unconstitutionally
obtained may be raised at any time and the court shall so inform the
person accused. Such an objection shall be entered in the record and
shall be determined by the court, without empanelling a jury. The
failure of the person accused to challenge the previous conviction
in the manner provided herein shall constitute a waiver on his part of
any allegation of unconstitutionality unless good cause be shown for
his failure to make timely challenge. ...
Regardless of the ultimate effect of Dalrymple on the language
of the New Mexico multiple offender statute, the decision is a significant step in the direction of assuring constitutional due process to

an alleged multiple offender.
HERBERT M. CAMPBELL II

